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Article 3

NOTES

Quincy Cable and Its Effect on the Access Provisions of
the 1984 Cable Act
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,I the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit found that the FCC's "must carry"
rules violated the first amendment rights of cable operators and
programmers. 2 The must carry rules require a cable operator to
carry in its cable package local broadcast stations "significantly
viewed in the community." The court concluded that the rules did
not necessarily further a substantial governmental interest and that,
even if they did further such an interest, they were not the least
restrictive means of achieving that objective.
In ruling that the must carry rules violated the first amendment, the Quincy court also raised serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the mandatory access requirements of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). 4 These
mandatory access requirements require cable operators to reserve
cable channels for public, educational, and governmental use.5
Congress passed the Act to ensure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local community, and to guarantee that cable communications provide the widest possible
6
diversity of information sources and services to the public.
1 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2 Id. at 1459.
3 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1984).
4 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1985).
5 The FCC's must carry rules at issue in Quincy required a cable system to carry in its
cable package all broadcast stations "significantly viewed" in the community which the system serves. 47 C.F.R. § 76.54(a) (1984). Such stations are determined under a complex
formula. Id.
In contrast, the mandatory access requirements of the Cable Act permit a local
franchising authority to require a cable operator to designate certain channels for public,
educational, or governmental use. 47 U.S.C.A. § 531 (West Supp. 1985). The Cable Act
also requires a cable operator with 36 or more channels to designate certain channels for
leased access by persons unaffiliated with the operator. Id. § 532.
The must carry rules and the mandatory access requirements are similar because both
allow the government- federal in the case of the must carry rules and § 532, local in the
case of § 53 1-to require a cable operator to carry a channel in his package which he might
not otherwise carry.
6 See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521(2), 521(4) (West Supp. 1985). The Cable Act also seeks to
achieve other objectives. These objectives include establishing a national policy concerning
cable communications, establishing uniform local franchising procedures, establishing federal, state and local regulatory guidelines, establishing an orderly and fair franchise renewal
procedure, and promoting competition within the cable communications industry. See id.
§ 521. See also H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 (1984).
426
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NOTES

Quincy suggests that the mandatory access provisions of the
Cable Act unconstitutionally dilute cable operators' first amendment rights. Because Congress has not found that broadcasters or
cable operators do not already fulfill the objectives outlined by the
Cable Act, it is far from clear that the mandatory access provisions
are the least restrictive means of achieving a substantial governmental interest, or that they in fact further such an interest.
This note examines the constitutionality of the Cable Act in
light of Quincy. Part I reviews the facts and holding of Quincy. Part
II discusses the mandatory access provisions of the Cable Act. Part
III analyzes the first amendment standards that apply to the print
and broadcast media and describes how the first amendment standard for the Cable Act should differ. Finally, Part IV concludes that
the mandatory access provisions, like the must carry rules, violate
cable operators' first amendment rights because they are not narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial governmental interest.
I. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,7 the court examined the constitutionality of the FCC's must carry rules, under which cable operators were obligated to carry in their cable packages local broadcast
stations "significantly viewed in the community."" Congress intended the must carry rules to assure that cable TV would not undermine the financial viability of free, community-oriented
television. 9 In promulgating the rules, the Commission concluded
that the public benefits more by receiving local broadcast service
than by receiving cable programming from distant locales.' 0
The petitioner in Quincy was a twelve-channel cable system located at a point equidistant from Seattle and Spokane, Washington." Under the must carry rules, Quincy Cable was required to
carry all of the broadcast stations significantly viewed in the community, even though the major networks were significantly viewed
in both Spokane and Seattle on different affiliate stations. This
would have required Quincy Cable to carry two ABC, two NBC,
and two CBS stations, occupying a total of six channels.1 2 Quincy
Cable argued that compliance with the rules would leave an insufficient number of channels for the many cable movie, entertainment,
7 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
8 See text accompanying notes 3 and 5 supra.
9 See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, First Report and Order in Docket No. 14895,
38 F.C.C. 683, 700 (1965).
10 Id.
11 768 F.2d at 1446.
12 Id.
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and sports services available. 13 Quincy Cable found this particularly unjust because its subscribers could receive the Spokane stations' over-the-air broadcast signals without the benefit of cable.14
Quincy Cable asked the FCC for a waiver of the rules. The Commission denied the request and fined Quincy Cable $5000 for fail5
ing to comply with the must carry rules.'
Quincy Cable appealed the FCC's ruling to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court unanimously
reversed the Commission's ruling, holding that the must carry rules
16
violated Quincy Cable's first amendment rights.
In determining the proper first amendment standard to apply
to the must carry rules, the court concluded that the first amendment standard for cable differed from the standard applicable to
the broadcast media.1 7 Although the scarcity rationale often justifies government regulation of the broadcast media, 18 the court
noted that "differences in the characteristics of news media justify
differences in the first amendment standards applied to them."' 19
Reasoning that cable does not utilize the public airwaves to transmit its messages to viewers, 20 the court concluded that the scarcity
13 Quincy polled its subscribers and determined that they would prefer to view three
specialized cable programs rather than the three Spokane network affiliates. Id. at 1447.
14 Id. at 1446.
15 Id. at 1447 (citing Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 89 F.C.C.2d 1128 (1982)).
16 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1459. In a companion case, Turner Broadcast System, Inc. v.
FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the District of Columbia Circuit reached the same
result for cable programmers. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. (TBS) filed a petition with
the FCC to institute rulemaking procedures to consider deleting the must carry rules. TBS
argued that as a cable programmer, with its holdings including Cable News Network (CNN),
CNN Headline News, and WTBS, it is in the business of selling a programming package to
cable operators, who actually deliver the cable signal to subscribing households. Where the
must carry rules require an operator to allocate a significant portion of its channels to must
carry signals, the rules operate to deprive programmers of opportunities to sell their services. Id. at 1445. The court recognized that TBS had standing to address this issue because
numerous petitions for waiver of the must carry rules from cable operators had stated that
the rules precluded them from carrying TBS programming. Id. at 1445 n.24.
17 768 F.2d at 1450.
18 The scarcity rationale was first discussed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). Under the scarcity rationale, the government may regulate the broadcast
industry to a greater extent than the print media because of physical limitations on the
number of broadcasters who may broadcast without interfering with one another. The
electromagnetic spectrum is a scarce physical resource which is "simply not large enough to
accommodate everybody." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 21213 (1943). See notes 66-87 infra and accompanying text.
19 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
386 (1969)).
20 In a cable system, television sets receive electrical impulses not through the airwaves,
but rather through coaxial cable. See M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA
LAw 630 (2d ed. 1982). In many respects cable systems resemble telephone systems, where
miles of cable extend underground or on poles throughout a municipality and where individual homes desiring service are accordingly wired off of the main line. See White v. City of
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rationale did not apply to the cable industry. 21
The court next considered whether it could characterize the
rules as an incidental burden on speech, thereby justifying analysis
under United States v. O'Brien.2 2 O'Brien imposes two requirements
on incidental restrictions on speech: first, "the restrictions must
further an important or substantial governmental interest," 2 3 and
second, the restrictions may "be no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." 24 The court doubted that the must
carry rules were an incidental burden on speech, since the rules
strongly burdened both cable programmers, who were bumped off
of cable systems, and cable operators, who were required to carry
certain speakers regardless of content or appropriateness for the
community. 25 Because it was not convinced that the must carry
rules were an incidental burden, the court suggested that O'Brien
may be too permissive a standard. 2 6 Nevertheless, the court found
that the must carry rules failed to satisfy even the lenient O'Brien
standard.
Addressing the substantiality of the governmental interest, the
Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 281 N.W.2d 283 (1979); Kreiss, Deregulationof Cable Television
and the Problem of Access Under the FirstAmendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1981).
The "head end" of the cable system is, in simple terms, a "super antenna" capable of
receiving broadcast signals of broadcasters out of range of conventional home television
antennae. This "super antenna" also receives cable subscription services broadcast via satellite or microwave relays. In addition, cable systems frequently are capable of providing
their own programming, and in some cases they are capable of two-way communication. See
STORER COMMUNICATIONS, BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK D-1 (1983). See also
TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK, CABLE AND SERVICES VOLUME (1984).
Because the costs of establishing a cable system are relatively high, municipalities usually grant a single company exclusive franchise rights to service that municipality for a set
time; one commentator concluded that 99.9% of cable operators have exclusive franchise
rights. Kreiss, supra, at 1005. The cable operators who receive the exclusive franchise thus
enjoy monopoly benefits in their respective communities. Id.
21 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1449. The Quincy court noted that in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's rules regulating indecent, but not obscene, radio broadcasts. The regulation was justified because of the pervasiveness of the broadcast industry and because the broadcast media is uniquely accessible
to children. Id. at 748-50. The Quincy court declined to follow Pacifica as an alternate basis
for regulating the cable industry because cable subscribers affirmatively invite cable into
their homes. In addition, subscribers can purchase lock boxes to regulate children's viewing habits. 768 F.2d at 1448-49 n.31.
22 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
23 Id. at 377.
24 Id.
25 768 F.2d at 1451-52.
26 Id. at 1450-54. The court even suggested that the appropriate standard might be
found in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Tornillo, the
Supreme Court held that the government may not force a newspaper editor to print that
which he otherwise would not. Id. at 258. See notes 58-65 hra and accompanying text.
The Quincy court, however, felt it unnecessary to apply Tornillo to the cable industry because
the restrictions imposed by the must carry rules failed under the more permissive O'Brien
test. 768 F.2d at 1453-54.
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court reasoned that although the FCC's objective-preserving free,
local television-may be legitimate, the Commission had produced
no evidence to suggest that cable television posed any threat to local broadcasting. 27 The FCC admitted that the perceived threat
was based on a "more or less intuitive model." 28 The court noted
that the Commission had made no attempt to study "any of the
admittedly speculative links in the chain of reasoning advanced in
support of the rules." 29 Because the Commission had not "put itself in a position to know" 30 whether the perceived threat was in
fact real, it could not know whether it was furthering an "important
1
or substantial governmental interest."'
Though this conclusion sufficed to invalidate the must carry
rules, the court continued with its analysis. The court found that,
even if the FCC could show that the must carry rules furthered an
important or substantial governmental interest, those rules failed
the second component of the O'Brien test.32 Although seeking to
protect local broadcasting, 33 the rules were "grossly overinclusive" 3 4 because they "indiscriminately protect[ed] each and every
local broadcaster regardless of the quantity of local service available in the community and irrespective of the number of local outlets already carried by the cable operator." 35
The court also observed that the rules did not reflect the way in
which cable systems actually affect the economic viability of different types of broadcasters. 36 The FCC was aware, for example, that
37
VHF stations are relatively immune from competition from cable;
the must carry rules were pointless as applied to VHF because viewers watched those stations regardless of whether they subscribed to
27 768 F.2d at 1456. Indeed, some FCC studies suggest that cable television poses no
threat at all to broadcast television. For example, in Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979) [hereinafter Economic Inquiry Report], the Commission stated that "[u]pon examination of the economic
evidence, we conclude that competition from cable television does not pose a significant
threat to conventional television or to our overall broadcast policies." Id. at 661. In Quincy,
the FCC contended that its conclusion in the Economic Inquiry Report assumed that the
must carry rules would remain intact. 768 F.2d at 1456. Although the court doubted this
explanation, it concluded that even if the FCC had not repudiated the underlying assumption of the must carry rules in the Economic Inquiry Report, neither had it proven that
cable threatened local broadcast stations. Id. at 1457.
28 768 F.2d at 1457 (quoting Inquiry Into Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 65 F.C.C.2d 914 (1977)).
29 768 F.2d at 1457.
30 Id. (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
31 768 F.2d at 1459.
32 Id. at 1460.
33 Id. (citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
34 768 F.2d at 1460.
35 Id. (footnote omitted).
36 Id. at 1462 (citing Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 27, at 639).
37 768 F.2d at 1462.
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cable. Furthermore, the rules did not distinguish between 100channel systems and twelve-channel systems, 38 or between those
cable systems saturated with must carry signals and those not saturated. 39 Because the rules were fatally overbroad, they failed the
second component of the O'Brien analysis and were therefore un0
constitutional under the first amendment4
II.

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984

Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934,41 which

provides the overall framework for regulation of the communications industry, long before the birth of cable television. As a result,
no national policy existed to guide the early development of the
cable industry. Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 to provide national guidance in the area of cable
regulation. 42 The two specific objectives of the Cable Act are to
ensure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests
of local communities, 43 and to make certain that cable communications provide the widest possible diversity of information sources
and services to the public. 44 To achieve these objectives, Congress
enacted sections 5314-5 and 532.46 Section 531 permits local
franchising authorities to require franchisees to designate certain
channels for public, educational, or governmental uses. Section
532 requires a cable operator to designate certain channels for use
by persons unaffiliated with the cable operator. 47 Like the FCC's
must carry rules, the mandatory access provisions force a cable operator to carry a channel in his package which he might not other38

Id. at 1462 n.55. Presumably a twelve-channel system operator would have his free-

dom of expression impinged upon more than would a 100-channel system operator, because a greater percentage of his channels would be affected.
39 Id. For example, Quincy Cable was required to carry at least six channels; another
system may have as few as two required channels.
40 Id. at 1462.
41 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-609 (West Supp. 1985).
42 See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984).
43 47 U.S.C.A. § 521(2) (West Supp. 1985).
44 Id. § 521(4). See also note 6 supra.
45 47 U.S.C.A. § 531 (West Supp. 1985).
46 Id. § 532.
47 The idea of public access to cable television apparently developed as part of a battle
for cable franchise rights in the Borough of Manhattan in New York City in the mid-1960s.
Potential franchisees offered a "soap box" channel on which anyone could appear to present their ideas. The concept caught on; local and federal policy makers, concerned over the
monopolization of the television industry by a select few, saw in cable a vehicle with which
to counteract the monopolies. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION
LAw 15.01 (1985). Section 531 is Congress' codification of this public access objective.
Section 532 complements § 531 by providing access for commercial stations to cable
television systems. Unlike § 531, § 532 is an affirmative duty imposed on cable operators;
Congress, perhaps bowing to a powerful lobbying effort, cut out all local control over
leased access channels.
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wise carry. 4 8 In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.49 (Midwest Video 11), the
United States Supreme Court, affirming the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, invalidated similar mandatory access rules. At
issue were the FCC's Cable Access Rules, 50 which required cable
systems with a minimum number of subscribers to dedicate a certain number of channels for public, educational, local governmental, and leased access. 5 1 The Court based its holding solely on the
FCC's lack of authority to promulgate such rules. 52 Now that Congress has passed the Cable Act, the FCC's jurisdiction is not an issue. The constitutionality of the access rules, however, remains very
much in doubt.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Midwest Video II suggested that
the FCC's access requirements violated cable operators' first
amendment rights. 53 This opinion sparked an intense debate over
the constitutionality of the Cable Act. Some argue that mandatory
access rules impermissibly infringe upon the first amendment rights
of cable operators by depriving operators of editorial control over a
certain number of their channels. 5 4 Others conclude that the right
of the public to receive diverse viewpoints ranks ahead of the cable
operators' first amendment right to control content. 55 Whether the
Cable Act survives constitutional scrutiny depends to a great extent
on the first amendment standard which courts will apply to the access rules. Although the Quincy court applied the O'Brien test to the
48 See note 5 supra.
49 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
50 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(b) (1977).
51 Id. See Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
52 440 U.S. at 696, 708-09. The Court did not address the first amendment issue, except to note that it was not frivolous. Id. at 709 n.19.
53 571 F.2d 1025, 1056-57 (1978). The court stated that it had "seen and heard nothing [in the case] to indicate a constitutional distinction between cable systems and newspapers in the context of the government's power to compel public access." Id. Thus, the
court applied Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), to conclude
that the FCC may not, consistently with the first amendment, control cable operators' editorial discretion.
54 See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE LJ. 1105 (1979). See generally Kreiss,
supra note 20, at 1010 n. 60; Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46. These commentators rely on
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which a newspaper rightof-reply statute was held unconstitutional. Because government may not require newspapers to publish something they otherwise would not publish, see notes 58-65 in ra and accompanying text, it is argued that government may not require cable operators to carry
something they otherwise would not carry. Whether the branch of government imposing
the requirement is local (§ 531) or national (§ 532) is immaterial. See Wellington, supra, at
1109-11; Kreiss, supra note 20, at 1010 n.60; Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46.
55 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th
Cir. 1981); Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985 (D.R.I. 1983); H.R.
REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-36 (1984). See generally Barron, Access to the Press-4
New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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FCC's must carry rules, 5 6 it also suggested that O'Brien 'nay be too
lenient. 57 In light of the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate
standard for cable, a discussion concerning the standards courts
have applied to the print and broadcast media is necessary to determine their applicability to the Cable Act.
III.

Finding an Appropriate First Amendment Standard for
Cable Television
A.

Access to Print Media

In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,58 the Supreme Court
examined a Florida right-of-reply statute which applied to newspapers. 59 The respondent, a candidate for political office, demanded
that the petitioner publish respondent's response to two critical editorials, as the statute required. 60 The petitioner refused this demand, claiming that the statute violated its first amendment
rights. 6 1 The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, holding
that the government may not compel 6a2 newspaper to publish that
which "reason" tells it not to publish.
Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Burger noted a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." 6 The ChiefJustice
expressed concern over the effects of newspaper monopolization in
a particular market. 6 4 .He nevertheless refused to sanction a government-induced right of access to the print media. He concluded
that although a responsible press is a desirable goal, "press responsibility is not mandated by the constitution, and like many other
65
virtues it cannot be legislated."
B. Access to Broadcast Media
Broadcasters traditionally have received special treatment
under the first amendment. In 1934, Congress enacted the Communications Act, establishing the Federal Communications Com56 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450-54. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text. Quincy is
not the only court to apply the O'Bien test to cable television. See Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating FCC regulations limiting the program fare
cablecasters and subscription broadcast television stations may sell to the public).
57 Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1453-54. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
58 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
59 Id. at 258.
60 Id. at 243-44.
61 Id. at 245.
62 Id. at 256, 258.
63
64
65

Id. at 252 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
418 U.S. at 241-42.
Id. at 256.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:426

mission (FCC).6 6 Congress authorized the FCC to regulate
broadcasting by issuing licenses to broadcasters serving the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity." 6 7 In 1943, the Supreme Court
upheld the FCC's licensing authority in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States. 68 The Court held that the scarcity of radio frequencies
necessitated government regulation. 69 The majority opinion explained that the electromagnetic spectrum was simply too small to
accommodate all potential users, and so the number of users who
70
could operate without interfering with one another was limited.
The licensing scheme was therefore necessary to avoid confusion
71
on the airwaves.
The Supreme Court further limited broadcasters' first amendment rights in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC72 by upholding the
"fairness doctrine" against constitutional attack. 73 Under the fairness doctrine, broadcasters are required to present fair coverage of
both sides of important public issues. Although the Court recognized that broadcasters have a first amendment interest in retaining
editorial control over the programs they broadcast,7 4 it held that
the unique characteristics of the broadcast industry justify limiting
that interest. 75 Specifically, the Court observed that the scarcity of
public airwaves 76 prohibits all who wish to broadcast from doing
So.77 The Court concluded that "it is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. 7
The fairness doctrine properly compensated for the lack of public
access to the airwaves by requiring broadcasters to make airtime
79
available to members of the public.
Red Lion did not sanction a general right of access to the nation's airwaves, however. In Columbia Broadcast System v. Democratic
66 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-609 (West Supp. 1985).
67 Id. § 307(a).
68 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
69 Id. at 227.
70 Id. at 213.
71 Id. at 226.
72 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
73 At the time the fairness doctrine consisted of two parts: 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) required
a broadcast station which had made air time available to any legally qualified candidate for
political office-a defined term-to provide equal opportunities to all other legally qualified
candidates seeking the same office; 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1969) provided that where a
broadcaster assaulted the integrity, character, or honesty of any person during the presentation of a controversial issue, the broadcaster had to offer that person a reasonable opportunity to reply.
74 Id. at 386.
75 Id. at 390-92.
76 Id. at 390; see note 18 supra.
77 395 U.S. at 388.
78 Id. at 390.
79 Id. at 391-92.
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National Committee,8 0 the Supreme Court held that Congress did not
impose a "common carrier" right of access for all persons wishing
82
to speak out on public issues. 8 1 Although the fairness doctrine
required that broadcasters provide a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance,8 3 the Court concluded
that the broadcaster must retain editorial control over the allocation of time for differing viewpoints. 8 4 A government-required
right of access could undermine the very goals sought by the fairness doctrine by permitting ,the wealthy to monopolize the air-

waves.8 5 The Court also feared that an absolute right of access

would inevitably implicate the FCC in a case-by-case determination
of who should be heard and when. This would result in even
greater government involvement in broadcast operations.8 6 Accordingly, the Court found no general right of access to the airwaves emanating from the first amendment.8 7
C.

Cable Regulation

Because cable television has certain characteristics which resemble both the print and broadcast media, courts and commentators have not reached a consensus on the appropriate first
amendment standard for cable. Some cases suggest that cable television more closely resembles the broadcast industry.8 8 These
courts point to heavy government regulation of cable operation and
in programming content,8 9 as well as the cable industry's use of
80 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
81 Id. at l10.
82 See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
83 412 U.S. at 110-11.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 121-25.
86 Id. at 128-30.
87 Id. at 131.
88 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1981); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I.
1983).
89 Government regulation of cable has followed several distinct phases. At first, the
FCC determined that the Communications Act of 1934 limited its jurisdiction to "common
carriers," see Industrial Radiolocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966), and broadcasters. Because cable systems fall into neither category, the FCC determined that it had no
regulatory authority over cable. See CATV and TV Repeater Service, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28
(1959).
Soon, however, the Commission began to assert jurisdiction over cable, reasoning that
regulation was justified because cable systems compete with broadcasters for audiences. In
United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the Supreme Court agreed that
the FCC could regulate the cable industry concerning the retransmission of distant broadcast signals through cable systems, because such regulations were "reasonably ancillary" to
the Commission's broadcast regulatory duties. Id. at 178. And in United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Midwest Video I), a plurality ruled that the FCC could
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public facilities such as public streets or utility poles. 90 Other
courts, citing the inapplicability of the scarcity rationale, have ruled
that cable more closely resembles the print media.9 '
Although it is clear that cable is a distinct medium, cable systems more closely resemble the print than the broadcast media.
The scarcity rationale, although justifying government regulation
of the broadcast industry, is wholly inapplicable to cable. 9 2 Similar
to newspapers placing their vending boxes on public streets, cable
operators string cables on public utility poles. The government
may designate where a newspaper may place its box; it may not,
however, regulate the content of the newspaper. The other argument commonly advanced to link cable with the broadcast mediathat cable has traditionally been regulated-is circular; cable is very
young, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue.
Cable, however, is not identical to the print media. In many
geographic areas, cable is the only meaningful way in which viewers
can receive television programming; numerous newspapers, by
contrast, are generally available in every community. In addition,
access to cable television is impossible for those whom the cable
require cable systems to have facilities available for local production and presentation of
programs. Id. at 664.
In Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979) (Midwest Video II), an appellate court expressly ruled on the first amendment rights
of cable operators for the first time. At issue were the FCC Cable Access Rules, 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.254(b) (1977), which required cable systems with a minimum number of subscribers to
dedicate at least four channels for public, educational, local governmental, and leased access. Id. See Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976). Because the rules were not "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's jurisdiction over broadcasting,
the Eighth Circuit held that the FCC lacked authority to promulgate the access rules. 571
F.2d at 1050-52. The court also addressed the "first amendment implications of a Commission effort to enforce unlimited public access requirements." See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
Midwest Video II was affirmed solely on the grounds that the rules were beyond the
authority of the FCC. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The Court invited Congress to remedy this
problem with appropriate legislation. Id. at 709. The Court did not address the first
amendment issue, except to note that "it is not frivolous." Id. See notes 49-52 supra and
accompanying text.
90 See Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.
1982) ("Cable television involves ... interference with other users of telephone poles and
underground ducts."); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp.
976 (D.R.I. 1983).
91 See Midwest Video 11, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), af'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See also
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Quinc,, 768 F.2d at 1450.
92 Another argument is that natural monopoly characteristics of cable create economic
constraints on competition comparable to the physical constraints imposed by the limited
size of the electromagnetic spectrum. See Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985-88. This economic scarcity
argument assumes that cable operators can charge monopolistic rates, which is unproven.
Indeed, most franchising authorities prescribe the rates operators may charge. Moreover,
the economic scarcity argument should apply with equal vigor to the print media; yet, no
court has ever attempted to do so.

NOTES

19861

operator chooses to ignore; 93 with newspapers, a person may distribute leaflets or even purchase advertising space in a newspaper.
The Quincy court elected to apply the O'Brien test, which allows minimal government regulation of speech if the restraint is merely incidental. O'Brien, as an intermediate standard, furnishes a fitting first
amendment framework which recognizes the unique nature of
cable.
IV.

Quincy's Impact on the Cable Act

O'Brien permits regulation of speech only if the regulation in
question is "incidental" in nature. However, the court in Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC94 noted that:
regulations intended to curtail expression-either directly by
banning speech because of a harm thought to stem from its
communicative or persuasive effect on its intended audience...
or indirectly by favoring certain classes of speakers over others... can be

justified (if at all) only under categorization doctrines such as
obscenity, "fighting words," or "clear and present danger." 95
Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
96
First Amendment."
It appears that the access rules favor one class of speakerslocal public, governmental, and educational entities-over other
speakers-cable programmers who are crowded off of a cable system. Arguably, the access provisions further the first amendment
rights of the public, which are "paramount" in the first amendment
pecking order. 97 Because cable operators retain control over the
majority of cable channels, the restraint on speech is arguably incidental to the goal of providing the public with diversity of information and opportunities for access. 98
93 See Berkshire, 571 F. Supp at 986. See also note 20 supra.
94 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
95 Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added).
96 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
97 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
98 The degree to which this is true depends upon the channel capacity of individual
cable systems. In Quincy, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that 38.7% of all cable
systems have fewer than 20 channels, and that 12.4% of all cable subscribers receive 12 or
fewer channels. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1434 (citing TELEVISION AND CABLE FACTBOOK, CABLE &
SERVICES VOLUME 1726 (1984)). The potential for more than an "incidental" restriction
increases as the number of unrestricted channels decreases. The Quincy court suggested
that this created a problem with the must carry rules: "Especially troubling is that the rules
... [do not] distinguish between systems that are saturated with must-carry signals and
those that are not." 768 F.2d at 1462 n.55. The Quincy court, however, did suggest that the
mandatory access rules are incidental because, unlike the must carry rules, they carry the
public's first amendment right to receive diverse viewpoints. Id. at 1452-53.
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Assuming that the access provisions are merely incidental restrictions, the O'Brien test can be applied. Under this test, the restrictions must further an important or substantial governmental
interest, and the restrictions cannot be greater than is essential to
further that interest.
Congress set two goals for the Cable Act: assuring that cable
systems are responsive to the communities they serve, and assuring
an adequate diversity of information sources and services. 9 9 Unlike
the must carry rules, 100 the access provisions are intended to serve
a countervailing first amendment interest by providing a forum for
public, educational, or government entities. 0 1 The objective is to
serve other first amendment values, arguably an "important or sub02
stantial" governmental interest.'
Although the goals of the Cable Act are important or substantial governmental interests, the access provisions do not necessarily
further these interests. The Supreme Court has stated that a court
"may not simply assume that the ordinance will always advance the
asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgement of expressive activity."' 0 3 In other words, courts will need to see some
evidence which shows that the statutes actually further an important governmental interest. Congress has made no finding that existing cable or broadcast outlets do not already meet the objectives
of the Cable Act. Because Congress has not shown that regulation
of cable is necessary to protect the public's first amendment rights,
it cannot show that the access provisions further the objective of
eliminating this fanciful threat.
A similar argument applies to the second O'Brien requirement
that the restrictions achieve the governmental objective in the least
restrictive manner. Sections 531 and 532 apply to cable operators
regardless of whether the Cable Act objectives are already met.
Further, Congress discounted the diversity and access opportunities available through local broadcast stations, apparently because it
assumed that cable displaces these stations. The FCC, however,
proved this assumption false. 10 4 Because Congress has not shown
that all cable markets suffer from insufficient diversity and access,
the access provisions are not the least restrictive means available to
achieve the governmental interest. They thus fail the second prong
of O'Brien.
99
100
101
102
103
2128
104

See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
768 F.2d at 1452-53.
Id.
Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118,
n.22 (1984).
See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
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As the foregoing discussion suggests, Congress has not "put
itself in a position to know" whether the access rules further an
important governmental interest and are no more restrictive than
essential to achieve that interest. The access provisions do not
meet either prong of the O'Brien test.
V. Conclusion
In Quincy, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that the FCC's must carry rules violated the first
amendment rights of cable operators and programmers. The court
applied the test applied in United States v. O'Brien to conclude that
the must carry rules were not the least restrictive means available to
further an important governmental interest. The objectives of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 are similar to those of
the must carry rules. Because Quincy invalidated the must carry
rules, the Cable Act may likewise be unconstitutional. It thus becomes critical to find an applicable first amendment standard for
cable.
The print and broadcast media have traditionally received different levels of first amendment protection. The print media enjoys
greater first amendment protection than does the broadcast media.
Because cable more closely resembles the print media, it should not
be regulated as heavily as the broadcast media. Cable is sufficiently
distinct from print, however, that it cannot be as free from government regulation. O'Brien furnishes a fitting first amendment framework for cable. Using this standard, the Cable Act does not satisfy
either prong of the O'Brien test.' 0 5
Congress, in enacting the Cable Act, acted before it had adequately studied the local effects of cable television. It has thus
"failed to put itself in a position to know" whether there are any
existing problems needing redress. Until it does so, the Cable Act
appears to violate the first amendment rights of cable operators and
programmers.
MarkJ. Bernet

105 Congress could more narrowly tailor the access provisions by requiring the FCC to
monitor local broadcast stations for both diversity and access opportunities. Where the
level of such broadcasting falls below a defined amount, the access provisions would require local cable operators to devote enough channel space to achieve that amount.
Where, however, the diversity and access opportunities meet the defined goal, there would
be no need for the access provisions. 768 F.2d at 1456-58. See also Inquiry into the General
Fairness Doctrine Obligation of Broadcast Licensees, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,323-25 (May
14, 1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910).

